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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY CHEMICAL TESTS TO
DETERMINE INTOXICATION
V. B. GOFF
The demand for accurate, scientific methods to
determine contested facts in a criminal case must
be balanced against the necessity to safeguard
constitutional rights. The conflict is not a novel
one. Past struggles concerned the admissibility
into evidence of finger-prints, firearms identifica-
tion, the results of medical examinations of ac-
cused persons, and radar speedometer tests, all
of which have become relatively commonplace
in criminal proceedings. Now the problem focuses
upon the admissibility of compulsory chemical
tests to determine alcoholic intoxication. There is a
further complication in the case of compulsory
blood tests due to the invasion of the body which
occurs when the skin is pierced or a body fluid or
other substance extracted.
Strong policy factors urge the acceptance of this
scientific evidence. Traffic deaths and injuries in
which consumption of alcohol was a factor have
increased at an alarming rate.1 Stricter enforce-
ment of the statutes which prohibit the operation
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol is sought and the need for an accurate
method for determining alcoholic intoxication is
especially acute. This latter observation is
strengthened by the fact that opinion evidence
'"National Safety Council, Accident Facts, 1956"
pp. 43-71 points out that in 1955 there were 38,000
deaths and 1,350,000 injuries in the United States,
an increase of 8% and 11%, respectively, since 1954.
According to reports from twenty states, in twenty-
six of 100 fatal motor vehicle accidents a driver or a
pedestrian had been drinking intoxicants. Similarly,
in a Delaware study of 97 fatal accidents, 56 of 138
drivers involved had been drinking to some extent.
(40.6%).
based upon the accused's speech, walk, demeanor,
odor of breath, and other available observations
concerning muscular incoordination are not
completely reliable, especially in the border-line
cases.
The reliability of chemical tests as a standard
for the determination of acoholic intoxication is
acknowledged by most medical experts today.
2
Forty-seven states have given legislative or judicial
approval to the use of chemical tests in the deter-
mination of intoxication.3 Of course, reliability is
affected by the methods employed, but assuming
that the test is properly administered and the evi-
dence identified and preserved, the objection to its
accuracy would probably vanish. Furthermore, the
test results do not create irrebuttable presumptions
of intoxication, but provide instead only another
factor for resolving the issue.4 The absence of
2 1 journal of Forensic Sciences 27-59 (1956).
3 See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,436 (1957),
footnote 3 which lists states which have given statutory
or judicial authority for the use of chemical tests to
determine alcoholic intoxication.
4 Those states which have adopted statutes have
patterned their legislation after §11-902 of the Uniform
Vehicle Code (1956) which creates the following pre-
sumptions:
"b1)...
1. If there was at that time 0.05 percent or less by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be
presumed that the defendant was not under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor;
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 percent
but less than 0.15 percent by weight of alcohol in the
defendant's blood, such fact shall not give rise to any
presumption that the defendant was or was not under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may
be considered with other competent evidence in de-
termining the guilt or innocence of the defendant;
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physical harm in properly administered tests and
the fact that the taking of body fluid specimens
has become commonplace medical procedure, are
frequently urged as further reasons for the ad-
mission of the compulsory chemical test results.
Those who oppose the admission of chemical
test evidence of intoxication, question the consti-
tutionality of the test procedure when conducted
without the consent of the accused. The conten-
tions have been made that to extract a specimen
of blood, urine, or saliva, or to conduct a breath
test without consent violates the privilege against
self-incrimination, constitutes an unlawful search
and seizure, and violates due process of law.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The most common objection to the admissi-
bility of the results of compulsory chemical tests
is that the privilege against self-incrimination
provided by the state constitution has been vio-
lated.5 The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which guarantees this privilege, does
not apply directly to the individual states, nor
are its provisions made applicable indirectly
through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Conse-
quently, the states themselves have determined the
circumstances under which the self-incrimination
privilege can be claimed.
Although the argument is frequently made
that compulsory submission to a blood, urine,
saliva or breath test forces an accused to supply
evidence to be used in his own prosecution in
violation of the privilege, the great majority of
courts have refused to accept this contention and
have concluded that historically the scope of the
privilege has been limited to testimonial compul-
sion.7 The privilege against self-incrimination,
it is asserted, was the culmination of a reaction
3. If there was at that time 0.15 percent or more by
weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood it shall be
presumed that the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor;
4. The foregoing provisions of paragraph (b) shall
not be construed as limiting the introduction of any
other competent evidence bearing upon the question
whether or not the defendant was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor."
-All but two states have constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the privilege against self-incrimination,
and in the two exceptions, Iowa and New Jersey, the
privilege is protected by statute. IOWA CODE NN.
tit. 31 §622.14 (1946); N. J. STAT. ANN. 2:97-7
(1937).6 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946) re-
affirming Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
7 See cases cited in Annot., 164 A.L.R. 967 (1946);
against inquisitions instituted by the Ecclesias-
tical Courts and by the Court of the Star Chamber
under the Stuart reigns for prosecution of heresy
and sedition. The resulting privilege was incor-
porated into the common law in the 17th century.
The conclusion is drawn that the privilege was
traditionally limited to the use of legal process
to obtain an admission of guilt from the witness's
own lips.8
The separate origin and development of the
rule excluding coerced confessions suggest that the
confession rule should have no effect on the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, but such has not
been the case. There is a tendency to merge the
two concepts, thereby making the privilege appli-
cable to evidence secured outside the courtroom if
obtained under compulsion. 9 Even under this view
of the self-incrimination privilege the chemical
tests would not seem to be objectionable, for the
rule excluding coerced confessions is predicated
upon the unreliability of the evidence so obtained.
Physical evidence is not altered by the amount of
compulsion employed. The percentage of alcohol
in the blood-stream is unaffected by the accused's
state of mind.
Only a small minority of courts refuse to con-
tain the self-incrimination privilege within its
historical bounds.'0 No distinction is drawn by the
"Texas view" between oral and physical evidence
and, therefore, any evidence, including the results
of chemical tests, is inadmissible when obtained
25 A.L.R. 2d 1407 (1952). Also, American Law In-
stitute, MODEL CODE OF EvmENCE, Rule 205.
88 WiGmoRE, EVIDENcE §§2250, 2263-65 (3d ed.
1940); INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINATION, WHAT CAN AN
AccusED PERSON BE COMPELLED To Do? (1950). Mr.
Justice Holmes observed in Holt v. United States, 218
U.S. 245, 252 (1910), "But the prohibition of com-
pelling a man i. a criminal court to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material."
9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "To attempt in this
case to distinguish between what lawyers call 'real
evidence' from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons
for excluding coerced confessions. Uses of involuntary
verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitu-
tionally obnoxious not only because of their unre-
liability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause even though statements contained in them may
be independently established as true." Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). See also Schaefer,
Federalism and Slate Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 11 (1956).
10 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.
2d 381 (1941). Comments criticizing this case are found
in 15 Cincinnati L. Rev. 344 (1941); 19 Texas L. Rev.
463 (1941); 26 Wash. L. Rev. 435 (1941).
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without consent. Although other courts have not
accepted the testimonial-real evidence distinction
adopted by the majority, few would embrace the
Texas view on self-incrimination and reject results
of chemical tests obtained through compulsion.
2
The related question of admissibility of comment
on the refusal to submit to a chemical test also
has been argued. Those courts which find no viola-
tion of the self-incrimination privilege where a
compulsory chemical test has been given would
certainly find no violation of the privilege where
comment on the refusal to submit was made.3
One jurisdiction has admitted evidence of refusal
" The "Texas view" has been modified considerably.
Application of paraffin to a suspect's fingers to determine
the presence of nitrates was held not to violate the
privilege in Henson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 266
S.W. 2d 864 (1953). Scrapings taken from an accused's
fingernails were held admissible, Coleman v. State,
151 Tex. Crim. 582, 209 S.W. 2d 925 (1948). However,
the court recently affirmed its original position on com-
pulsory chemical tests by refusing to admit this evi-
dence where the state failed to prove consent. Trammel
v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 543, 287 S.W. 2d 487 (1956).
12 Those states which might follow the Texas view
are as follows: Arkansas, Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277,
10 S.W. 2d 370 (1928), which rejected evidence of an
examination for venereal disease, but was modified
to a degree by Shannon v. State, 200 Ark. 658, 182
S.W. 2d 384 (1944) which admitted fingerprints;
Michigan, People v. Corder, 244 Mich. 274, 221 N.W.
309 (1928) which rejected evidence of an examination
for venereal disease, but was weakened by People v.
Placido, 310 Mich. 404, 17 N.W. 2d 230 (1945) which
indicated a preference for the Wigmore rule; Missouri,
State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo. 54, 119 S.W. 405 (1909),
which rejected evidence of an examination for venereal
disease. On the other hand, Oklahoma recently adopted
the majority view in Alexander v. State, 305 P. 2d
572, (Okla. Crim. 1956) after an earlier indication of a
contrary policy' in Turvey v. State, 95 Okla. Crim.
418, 247 P. 2d 304 (1952). In the Alexander case the
court found that submission to the breath test was not
voluntary and adopted the Wigmore View since they
found no substantial difference between fingerprints
and a breath sample. Furthermore, the court enunciated
the policy that a "fetish" should not be made of the
self-incrimination provision "to protect enemies of
society." In Wisconsin, Green Lake County v. Domes,
247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W. 2d 348 (1945), held that the re-
sults of a general physical examination did not violate
the privilege, and City of Barron v. Covey, 271 Wis. 10,
72 N.W. 2d 387 (1955), held that the lower court er-
roneously refused to permit comment on the accused's
failure to submit to the test. Recently, the court in
State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W. 2d 810 (1956),
held specifically that a blood test did not violate the
privilege, even though the court acknowledged that this
right extended beyond mere oral statements.
13 State v. Gatton, 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E. 2d 265
(1938); People v. McGinnis, 123 Cal. App. 2d 945,
267 P. 2d 458 (1953); City of Barron v. Covey, 271
Wis. 10, 72 N.W. 2d 387 (1955); State v. Smith 230
S.C. 164, 94 S.E. 2d 886 (1956). Comment on refusal
to submit is now prohibited by statute in Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. §§18-75.1 (Cum. Supp. 1956) nullify-
ing, in effect, Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945,
81 S.E. 2d 614 (1954).
to submit to a chemical test even though holding
that evidence of a compulsory test violates the
self-incrimination privilege. The'rationale adopted
to allow such comment is that the evidence indi-
cates the accused's conduct, demeanor, and also
his attitude toward the crime, all of which sug-
gest a consciousness of guilt. 4
Some state statutes which authorize the use of
test results specifically prohibit comment upon
the failure to submit to the test.'5 Whenever the
statute prohibits compulsory tests or makes ab-
solute the right of refusal, 6 the courts have
reasoned that the legislature also intended to
exclude evidence of the refusal to submit. 7
In summary, if the self-incrimination privilege
is interpreted from an historical point of view,
there can be no objection to the evidence ob-
tained by means of a compulsory chemical test.
The purpose of the privilege is to protect against
the extraction of evidence from the accused's
lips and to safeguard his right to remain silent at
his trial. To extend the coverage of this privilege
to physical evidence obtained through compulsion
is to lump with the self-incrimination privilege
the principles of the rule against coerced confes-
sions and due process concepts which results in an
unnecessary extension of the privilege.
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A second contention frequently made is that a
compulsory chemical test constitutes an illegal
search and seizure and that the evidence so ob-
tained should be suppressed on timely motion in
any jurisdiction which follows the exclusionary
rule respecting illegally obtained evidence. 8 Since
the exclusionary rule, which is followed in the fed-
eral courts, is not binding upon the states, they
1 State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W. 275
(1941).
"5 COLO. REV. STAT. §13-4-30 (Gum. Supp. 1955);
GA. CODE ANN. §68-1625 (Cum. Supp. 1955); ME.
REv. STAT. c. 22 §150 (Cum. Supp. 1957); NEB. REv.
STAT. §39-727.01 (1943); ORE. Comp'. LAWS ANN.
§483.630 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. §18-75.1-75.3
(Cum. Supp. 1956); WASiR REv. CODE §46.56.010
(1951).
'S COLO. REv. STAT. §13-4-30 (Cum. Supp. 1955);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §189.520 (1956); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §39:4-50.1 (Supp. 1951); VA, CODE ANN. §§18-
75.1-75.3 (Cum. Supp. 1956); WAsh. REV. CODE
§46.56.010 (1951). Idaho, Kansas, New York, and
Utah have enacted implied consent statutes which
grant the right to refuse. (See infra note 45).
17 People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 143 N.Y.S.
2d 362 (1955); State v. Severson, 75 N.W. 2d 316,
(N.D. 1956); Duckworth v. State, 309 P. 2d 1103
(Okla. Crim. 1957).
"8 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
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are left free to determine the status in their own
courts of illegally seized evidence.19 In a majority
of jurisdictions the exclusionary rule is not ap-
plied,"1 although there is some indication of a
movement to extend the adoption of the rule
either by statute or decision.2 The exclusionary
rule has not been highly regarded by many author-
ities;" they feel that its net effect is to reduce the
amount of reliable evidence in situations where the
demand for truth outweighs personal incon-
venience, short of violence to the person or the
related problem of untrustworthy confessions.
The basis for the rule, of course, is to protect indi-
vidual interests from invasions of privacy without
lawful warrants and to discourage overzealous
police activity by rejecting the evidence thus ob-
tained, regardless of its reliability.?
The provision which prohibits unlawful search
and seizure creates problems primarily in those
jurisdictions which have adopted the exclusionary
rule. 4 The questions posed are 1) whether the
withdrawal of body fluids without a warrant is an
unlawful search and seizure; 2) whether the search
is made incident to a lawful arrest; and 3) whether
the search is reasonable.
When the exclusionary rule courts have been
confronted with the problem of whether submis-
sion to a compulsory chemical test is a search and
seizure, they have uniformly held that it is and
have passed on to the more difficult problems of
the reasonableness of the search and whether the
19 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) contains an
appendix listing those states which do and do not apply
the Weeks doctrine.
2" MD. ANN. CODE GE-. LAws art. 35 §§5, 5a (Cur.
Supp. 1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-27 (Michie 1953);
TEX. CODE OF CRi. PRO. tit. 8. art. 727a (Vernon
Cum. Supp 1957). People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 P. 2d 905 (1955); Rickards v. State, 45 Dela. 573,
77 A. 2d 199 (1950).
2'8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2184 (3d ed. 1940);
Harno, Evidence Obtained By Illegal Search and Seizure,
19 Ill. L. Rev. 303 (1925); Waite, Police Regulations
By Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 679 (1944).
23 "We have been compelled to reach that conclusion
(evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure is in-
admissible] because other remedies have completely
failed to secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions on the part of police officers with the at-
tendant result that the courts under the old rule have
been constantly required to participate in, and in effect
condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement
officers." People v. Cahan 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.
2d 905, 911 (1955).
2" The evidence of the test results was admitted in
the following jurisdictions even though illegally seized:
State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A. 2d 909 (1950)
dictum; Davis v. State, 189 Md. 640, 57 A. 2d 289
(1948).
search was made incident to a lawful arrest.5 One
court, while recently seeking to determine whether
the taking of a blood specimen was incidental to
the arrest, recognized that the withdrawal of the
blood might be reasonable if the suspect were
under lawful arrest, but concluded that a nine
day interval between the seizure and the sub-
sequent arrest itself was not a search made inci-
dent to the arrest.'5 The court indicated that even
though the arrest does not necessarily have to
precede the search, the two events must approxi-
mate each other in terms of time.
7
In contrast with this view, however, is that of
another jurisdiction to the effect that even though
the taking of a blood specimen precedes the arrest,
if reasonable grounds existed for an arrest when
the specimen was obtained, then the seizure was
lawful as an incident to the arrest.8 This rule was
laid down in a case in which blood was removed
from a semi-conscious suspect who indicated a
lack of consent by withdrawing his arm when
approached with a needle. Since that jurisdiction
(California) had recently adopted the federal ex-
clusionary rule, the issue of an illegal search was
raised." The court found that on the basis of the
25 People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P. 2d
690 (1957); State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.
2d 810 (1956), modified, 80 N.W. 2d 816 (1957).
26 The accused was taken to a hospital where a blood
sample was withdrawn without his consent on the basis
of the detection of alcohol on his breath and the fact
that the accident occurred in the opposite lane of
travel. Nine days after the accident and the chemical
test the accused was placed under formal arrest. The
issue before the court was whether a search could be
made incident to an arrest and, if so, whether the nine
day lapse satisfied the "incident" requirement. The
test results were held inadmissible and in reaching the
decision the court expressed doubt as to whether prob-
able cause for arrest existed due to the lack of evidence
indicating intoxication. State v. Kroening, 274 Wis.
266, 79 N.W. 2d 810 (1956) modified, 80 N.W. 2d 816
(1957) where remarks concerning due process were
withdrawn since the issue had not been argued in the
briefs or before the court.
27"While the attorney general correctly says that
a search and seizure which is incidental to a lawful
arrest does not violate the constitutional rights of the
person searched, the lapse of time between the search
and arrest is important and in some cases, as this, vital
in determining whether the search is incident to the
arrest. In Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89
(1923) an arrest on the day following the search came
too late for such incidental connection.. ." State v.
Kroening, supra note 26 at 79 N.W. 2d 815.
2" People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P. 2d
690 (1957); see also the same case in the intermediate
appellate court at 303 P. 2d 617 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956).
29 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905
(1955).
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evidence 0 there was reasonable cause to believe
that the accused had committed a felony and,
therefore, a search could be made even though it
preceded the arrest.31
A flexible standard of what constitutes an inci-
dent to a lawful arrest permits a test to be made a
reasonable time before the actual arrest has taken
place and thereby assures the evidentiary value of
the test. The time element may be vital from the
standpoint of accuracy as well as statutory re-
quirements respecting the time in which the
test must be administered.n Since reasonable
cause for making an arrest is a prerequisite to the
lawfulness of the seizure of the body fluid or sub-
stance to be tested, the dangers of indiscriminate
testing and exclusive reliance on test results to
determine the existence of a violation would be
avoided.
The requirement of reasonable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed before an arrest
can be made, thus permitting a search to be con-
ducted, may create additional problems in a juris-
diction following the exclusionary rule. Frequently,
it is difficult to gather evidence of the suspect's
intoxication since the only available evidence of
intoxication may be the occurrence of the accident
and the odor of alcohol on the driver's breath,
evidence which some courts would find insufficient
for making an arrest.Y The law enforcement offi-
30 An eyewitness testified that the car was going fast
and that the brake lights failed to illuminate when the
car passed through a boulevard stop sign, struck a warn-
ing sign, and rammed into the bank of a ditch. There
were no tire skid marks to be found. Beer cans were
discovered in the back seat and one passenger was
clutching a beer can in one hand and a wine bottle in
the other when found. All occupants had the odor of
alcohol on their breaths and the accused, after being
taken to the hospital, regurgitated matter of a strong
alcoholic odor whereupon the blood test was admin-
istered. People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.
2d 690 (1957).
31 "There is no claim that defendant was not ar-
rested within a reasonable time or that the arrest was
not made on the basis of the facts known to the officer
who investigated the accident, and we must presume
a lawful arrest in the absence of a showing to the con-
trary." Id. at 693. In State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259
P. 2d 261 (1953) there were no indications of the
grounds for arrest in the stipulation of facts, but the
court concluded that the grounds for arrest must have
been reasonable.
' N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW §70 (5); VA.
CODE §18-75.1 imposes a two hour time limit within
which the test must be made, measured from the time
of arrest. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11 §3507 (Supp. 1956);
WIS. STAT. §325.235 (1955) impose a two hour time
limit within which the test must be made, measured
from the event itself.
- In State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W. 2d
810 (1956) the court indicated that evidence of the
accident and the odor of alcohol on the driver's breath
would be insufficient grounds for making an arrest.
cers, in recognition of the requirements exacted
by the exclusionary rule, as well as the reasonable
cause standards of arrest, will be quick to make an
arrest on grounds other than driving while under
the influence of alcohol, even though such grounds
be relatively minor.4 This presumably affords the
right to make a search and thus seize a sample of
blood, urine, breath, or saliva to support the more
serious charge. This practice, of course, tends to
weaken the policy sought to be enforced by the ex-
clusionary rule.
DUE PROCESS
Since the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Rochin v. California,35 the constitutional
argument of denial of due process has been bol-
stered and is made available to an accused who has
been compelled to submit to a chemical test. The
issue of the reasonableness of the search and
seizure is an issue of due process, the point being
that in states not following the exclusionary rule
it is necessary to employ the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, or its equivalent in the state constitution,
to exclude such evidence. In the Rochin case a
physical struggle occurred and the accused's
stomach was pumped against his will in order to
obtain narcotic capsules that he had swallowed. 6
The Supreme Court declared the law enforcement
conduct to be a violation of due process of law and
reversed the conviction. The stomach pumping
incident was considered to be "shocking" and
"offensive."7
The multiplicity of policy factors which compose
the elements of due process resulted in the adop-
m In Alexander v. State, 305 P. 2d 572 (Okla. Crim.
1956), arrest was for an unauthorized left hand turn
after which the accused was taken to the police station
and given various tests including a breath test. In
Fletcher v. State, 298 S.W. 2d 581 (Tex. Crim. 1957)
the accused was arrested while sitting in his parked
auto for being drunk in a public place.
35 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
36 Rochin, who was thought to be dealing in nar-
cotics, swallowed two capsules when seized without
warrant by police officers in his own home. After they
had failed to extract the capsules by "jumping on"
Rochin and attempting to pry his mouth open, he was
handcuffed and taken to an hospital where an emetic
solution was forced through a tube into his stomach,
whereupon he gave up the capsules later found to
contain morphine.
3 ,,... We are compelled to conclude that the pro-
ceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more
than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private
sentimentalism about combatting crime too energeti-
cally. This is conduct that shocks the conscience ...
this course of proceeding by agents of government to
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities ... convictions cannot be brought about
by methods that offend a 'sense of justice' ...." Id. at
172, 173.
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tion of a test by the Supreme Court that was
necessarily ill-defined. The Court could only
outline the general consideration that conduct
offensive to the community sense of justice consti-
tuted a violation of due process. The application
of the test in future cases would depend upon the
particular facts involved in each one of them.
After the Rochin decision, the question of
whether a compulsory chemical test constituted
conduct proscribed by that case was debated in the
state courts. The trend of the decisions has been
to limit the application of this doctrine to brutal
and shocking conduct, not found to exist where
chemical tests were administered by qualified
persons. In support of the blood test specifically,
and of the chemical tests generally, the state
courts have pointed to the lack of danger and the
frequent use of blood specimens for such purposes
as marriage licenses, pre-induction military physi-
cals, normal medical care, and admission to uni-
versities. Furthermore, policy factors favored the
admissibility of the evidence, since statistics
clearly show that alcohol is a major factor in
traffic deaths.9
Recently, the United States Supreme Court
itself was confronted in Breithaupt v. Abram5
with this issue of whether the compulsory chem-
ical test violated due process as formulated in the
Rochin case. In the Breithaupt case a blood sample
was taken from an unconscious motorist without
38 State v. Berg. 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P. 2d 261 (1953),
where the conscious suspect was placed in restraining
straps while his head was being held in order to obtain
a breath specimen. The court attempted to distinguish
between a natural product of the body which was
utilized and elements of the body that require break-
ing the skin for example. To attempt to distinguish
between the two in this manner is to rely solely on the
nature of the invasion, excluding the additional factors
of force and commonness of the experience used to
obtain the sample. People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d
252, 260 P. 2d 8 (1953) accused was unconscious;
McClanahan v. State, 232 Ind. 248, 112 N.E. 2d 575
(1953); note also the modified opinion in State v.
Kroening, 80 N.W. 2d 816 (1957) withdrawing remarks
concerning due process since the issue was not fully
argued on review.
39 See note 1 supra.
40 The violation occurred in New Mexico, a state
that does not follow the Weeks doctrine of excluding
illegally seized evidence, when the accused was in-
volved in a collision killing three occupants of the
second car. A pint bottle of whiskey almost empty was
found in the car of the petitioner and the odor of alcohol
was detected on his breath. Breithaupt did not aI eal
his conviction, relying instead on a writ of habeaus
corpus to the New Mexico Supreme Court which had
denied the writ. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment, three
Justices dissenting. Breithaupt v. 'Abram, 352 U.S.
432 (1957).
his consent and the results of a chemical test for
alcoholic intoxication were admitted into evidence.
The majority opinion characterized the Rochin
case just as did the state courts, emphasizing the
fact that brutality measured by the community
sense of justice was involved and not that of any
particular individual." Although due process was
not considered violated by the extraction of a
blood sample without consent, the Court indi-
cated that if tests should be made indiscriminately
or conducted by unqualified personnel, then there
may be a basis for the application of the Rochin,
doctrine."2
The dissenting opinions in the Breithaupt case
noted the similarities between this case and the
Rochin case by pointing out the invasion of the
person's body, the public interests which are
involved, and the lack of dangerous after-effects.
They concluded that the two cases could be dis-
tinguished by the majority only on the grounds
of physical resistance and personal reaction
against the stomach pump in the Rochin case,
criteria which the dissenters considered unsub-
stantial.4" This serves to emphasize the great
difficulty encountered in the attempt to formulate
standards of due process by which to judge con-
duct.
While there may be truth in the dissent's com-
ment that the test adopted by the majority
places the due process concept on "shifting sands,"
it seems appropriate that there be flexibility here.
When weighing policy factors, it is quite probable
that a different result will be obtained not only as
the facts change, but as the social values of the
community change with time." The validity under
due process considerations, for example, of a
compulsory chemical test which is made after a
skirmish with the police, or a urine sample secured
from either a conscious or unconscious narcotic
suspect by compulsory catheter, remains open.
41 1,... due process is not measured by the yard-
stick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of the
most sensitive person, but by the whole community
sense of 'decency and fairness" that has been woven
by common experience into the fabric of acceptable
conduct." Id. at 436.
4Id. at 438.
43 "Only personal reaction to the stomach pump and
the blood test can distinguish them. To base the re-
striction which the Due Process Clause imposes on
state criminal procedures upon such reactions is to
build on shifting sands." Id. at 442.
11 "In the common-law process, decided cases be-
come fixed points from which boundaries are drawn and
contours filled in. That is the process that has been used
from the outset in giving meaning to the due process
clause." Schaefer, Federalism and Slate Crimnal Pro-
cedure, op. cit. supra.
CRIMINAL LAJU CASE NOTES .IND COMMENTS
There are basic factors, however, to be taken into
account when determining whether conduct offends
the community sense of justice. These are the
brutality of the conduct of the law enforcement
officers, the community reaction to the particular
type of invasion as determined by the court, and
the public interests involved. For present pur-
poses it is sufficient to state by way of summary
that a compulsory blood test made by qualified
personnel in the proper manner without violence
to determine whether the suspect was driving
while under the influence of alcohol is not a viola-
tion of due process of law.
IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTES
Prompted by the public policies already men-
tioned, as well as the effort to obtain evidence of
the chemical test and still avoid the problems
caused by belligerent or unconscious suspects,
some states have enacted implied consent statutes
as a remedial device.4 i The rationale of the
legislation is that use of the highways is a
privilege that is subject to reasonable conditions
which the state may impose in the interests of
public safety and welfare. The states have tradi-
tionally enforced these requirements through the
media of license, fine, and imprisonment. Conse-
quently, it is contended that it is reasonable for a
state to enact a statute which provides that every
motorist who operates a vehicle upon the public
highways gives his consent to submit to a chemical
test should he be arrested for driving while under
the influence of alcohol. Further, the statute pro-
vides that even though he has consented to the
test, he also may refuse to submit, but if he does
refuse, the privilege of using the public highways
in that state is forfeited, provided, however, that a
subsequent hearing held by the licensing agency
discloses an unreasonable refusal to submit to the
test.
The statute which implies consent to submit to a
chemical test has raised a number of constitu-
tional arguments, chief among which are the al-
leged violation of the self-incrimination privilege,
the violation of provisions which afford protection
against unlawful search and seizure, and the de-
nial of due process. The arguments are essentially
those described heretofore and the cases dealing
with the question have found no compulsion even
'5 IDAItO CODE §49-352 (1957); KAN. GEN. STAT.
§8-1001-07 (Supp. 1955); N.Y. VEHIcLE AND TRAFFIC
§71.a; UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1957).
where the driver was warned that his license
might be revoked should he fail to submit to the
test.46 Another case held that where the accused
failed to submit to the test and was acquitted of
the charge of drunken driving, the hearing official
still had the power granted under the statute to
revoke the driver's license, since this was a sepa-
rate proceeding from the criminal charge,
Another constitutional argument raised has been
that of denial of equal protection of the laws on
grounds that the statute does not apply with equal
force to unlicensed drivers. This contention was
summarily dismissed by one court. s
These implied consent statutes are analogous to
the statutes dealing with jurisdiction over non-
resident motorists, which also rely on the concept
of implied consent through operation of a vehicle
on a public road.4 There are substantial differ-
ences, however. The nonresident motorist statute
does not involve a physical invasion of the person.
Neither does it involve problems of self-incrimina-
tion and unlawful search and seizure, nor does it
provide for an option to refuse, which gives rise
to an alternate punishment.
Although the hearing itself has been unsuccess-
fully challenged as a criminal action without a
judge and jury, and without protection of the self-
incrimination privilege and rules of evidence, 0
no one has questioned the licensing agency's
right and power to conduct a hearing to determine
the reasonableness of the suspect's refusal to sub-
mit to the test. The courts have held that the
hearing is not a criminal trial, but merely an ad-
ministrative function to determine whether the
privileges granted by the state should be revoked.
It is apparently conceded that the delegation of
power to entertain the hearing is proper and that
the standards of reasonableness are adequately
defined.5'
The implied consent statute has not as yet
been thoroughly tested by the courts. It is not
certain that the consent obtained would be suffi-
46 People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73, 120 N.E. 2d 211
(1954); People v. Davidson, 5 Misc. 2d 699, 152 N.Y.S.
2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1956) reversed on other grounds.
17 Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.
2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d
491, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 934 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
48 Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S. 2d
116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
49 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
50 Schutt v. MacDuff supra note 48.
-1 See Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 47 Col. L. Rev. 359, 561 (1947), especially at
581 et seq.
[V'ol. 49
